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Dorothy had it mostly right: There are few places like home. This, I believe,
is the most significant takeaway from the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.1 A unanimous Court rejected
an attempt by the North Carolina state courts to assert general jurisdiction over
three foreign tire manufacturers charged with responsibility for a bus accident in
France. Casting doubt over a large body of lower court decisions that found
mere systematic commercial activity in the forum sufficient to establish general
jurisdiction,4 the Court appeared to declare that defendants are not subject to
general jurisdiction unless they are "essentially at home" in the forum.5
Goodyear Dunlop was, on its facts, a very easy case. Defendants' indirect
contacts with the forum would have probably been insufficient even to establish
.Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School-Camden. Thanks to Beth Stephens, Rick Swedloff,
and the participants at the Symposium for their helpful comments on this paper.
1. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
2. General jurisdiction refers to the authority of a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a
defendant regardless of whether the cause of action has any connection to the forum. Specific
jurisdiction, in contrast, refers to the authority that a court has to assert personal jurisdiction over a
particular claim connected to the forum. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1136 (1966).
3. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2580-51.
4. See, e.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2003) reh'g
granted by 366 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2004), and vacating as moot by 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005)
(finding general jurisdiction over defendant based on maintenance of website and solicited sales to
forum residents); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir.
1996) (regular sale to forum residents plus in-state visits to dealers and customers supports general
jurisdiction); Rittenhouse v. Marby, 832 F.2d 1380, 1390 (5th Cir. 1987) (defendant's operation of
in-state office one day per week subjects it to general jurisdiction); Provident Nat'l Bank v. Cal.
Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 438 (3d Cir. 1987) (establishing general jurisdiction on the
basis of depositor's resident in forum and dealings with a local bank); Ex parte Newco Mfg. Co.,
481 So. 2d 867, 869 (Ala. 1985) (basing general jurisdiction on substantial sales to forum residents).
5. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
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specific jurisdiction over claims arising from those contacts.6 The lower court's
finding of general jurisdiction over a largely unrelated cause of action was thus
deeply flawed.7 Much of what the Supreme Court offered to guide future cases
is, therefore, dictum and raises as many questions as it answers. Nonetheless, I
believe that the case will prove to be one of the wisest and most consequential
jurisdictional decisions in recent years.
General jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant serves little or no
legitimate purpose. A plaintiff can always pursue a defendant in the defendant's
home forum 8 and, in most cases, can proceed where the claim arose.9 Allowing
a plaintiff additionally to pursue a defendant wherever it regularly conducts
business opens the door to flagrant forum shopping and invites difficult choice-
of-law problems. Although Goodyear Dunlop leaves many questions
unanswered, its apparent constriction of general jurisdiction thus represents a
positive development. This Article will attempt to provide guidance to courts
attempting to construe the "essentially at home" standard and suggest that it
represents a sound and workable basis to assess the limits of general jurisdiction.
I. THE GOODYEAR DUNLOP DECISION
The case arose out of a bus accident outside of Paris that injured several
members of a soccer team from North Carolina.1° The plaintiffs alleged that a
defective tire, manufactured in Turkey by a Goodyear subsidiary and distributed
by other Goodyear subsidiaries, was a cause of the accident." The plaintiffs
brought suit in a North Carolina state court against Goodyear Dunlop and three
of its foreign subsidiaries.12 The North Carolina Youth Soccer Association wasalso named as a defendant, thereby preventing removal to federal court. 13
6. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality opinion)
(manufacturer of a machine sold in the forum by a third party not subject to personal jurisdiction for
a claim arising from the use of the machine in the forum).
7. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851-52 (citing Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 384, 388,
392-94 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), rev'd sub nom. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846) (discussing case history
and connection with North Carolina).
8. See, e.g., Planning Group of Scottsdale, L.L.C. v. Lake Mathews Props., Ltd., 246 P.3d
343, 346 (Ariz. 2011) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940)); Follette v. Clairol, Inc.,
829 F. Supp. 840, 846 (W.D. La.) (general jurisdiction over corporation should be limited to place
of incorporation or principal place of business), aff'd, 998 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1993).
9. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (specific
jurisdiction is permitted "[w]hen a controversy is related to or 'arises out of' a defendant's contacts
with the forum").
10. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
11. Id. at 2850-52.
12. Id. at 2850.
13. See Amended Complaint, Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (No. 05
CVS 1922), rev'd sub nom. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846. The original complaint named only the
several soccer organizations responsible for organizing the travel and alleged that as joint venturers,
they were all responsible for the driver's negligent operation of the bus. See Complaint at [ 5-8,
10, 681 S.E.2d 382 (No. 05 CVS 1922). Plaintiffs alleged that an agent of the joint venture
[VOL. 63: 527
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The three foreign subsidiaries moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. 14 The trial court denied the motion without citing a single 
case, 15
finding jurisdiction supported by several factors:
1. The tire contained information written in English, and was
approved for sale in the United States.
1 6
2. In the three year period from 2004 through 2007, several
thousand tires manufactured by the defendants were shipped
into North Carolina, "although not by the original
manufacturer." 17
3. The defendants, "on a continuous and systematic basis caused
tires to be sent into the United States for sale, and knew or
should have known that some of those tires were distributed for
sale in North Carolina" by their U.S. parent, Goodyear-
Dunlop. 18
The court found that the quantity of tires shipped into the state supported
general jurisdiction, but it also found that "the cause of action... [was] closely
related to the contacts with the defendants" and that "North Carolina ha[d] a
substantial interest in allowing its citizens a forum."' 19
The state appellate court affirmed in an only slightly better crafted opinion.
Without even citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,21 the
only general jurisdiction decision from the Supreme Court in the last fifty
years, 2 the court determined that general jurisdiction was supported by
defendants' continuous and systematic contacts with North Carolina. Although
the court concluded that the cause of action here was not related to defendants'
24contacts with the state, it relied on Justice Brennan's concurrence in Asahi
distracted the driver by "animated conversation," and that this distraction caused the accident. Id. at
$ 51. The Goodyear defendants were subsequently added by amended complaint. Amended
Complaint, supra.
14. Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 385, 2.
15. Id. at 385-87.
16. Id. at 385, JR 4-5.
17. Id. at 385, 6-8. Allegedly, 5,906 tires manufactured by Goodyear Lastikleri T.A.S.,
the Turkish subsidiary, 33,923 tires manufactured by the French subsidiary, and 6,402 tires
manufactured by the Luxembourg subsidiary were sent into the state. Id.
18. Id. at 386, [ 10-13.
19. Id. at 386-87, I [ 19-22.
20. See id. at 382.
21. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
22. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011)
("In only two decisions postdating International Shoe... has this Court considered whether an out-
of-state corporate defendant's in-state contacts were sufficiently 'continuous and systematic' to
justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims unrelated to those contacts .... " (citing
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952))).
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Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Cour?5 in finding sufficient contacts to support
jurisdiction because defendants had placed their tires in the "stream of
commerce" with "the expectation that they would be purchased in the forum
state. ' 26 The court thus failed to recognize that Asahi was a case about specific
jurisdiction that arose directly from the failure of the defendant's product in the
forum.27 If a first-year law student had written that answer on my Civil
Procedure final exam, I would have had a hard time giving it a passing grade.
28
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, had little difficulty in
concluding that the defendants' contacts with the forum fell "far short" of the
level of contacts necessary to sustain its assertion of .*urisdiction over "claims
unrelated to anything that connects them to the State." 9 Noting that the lower
court had "elided the essential difference between" specific and general
jurisdiction,30 the Court found the defendants' contacts to be no more significant
than in Helicopteros, in which the defendant directly engaged in far more
substantial economic activity in the forum: the defendant there had bought its
entire fleet of helicopters, trained its pilots, and negotiated in the forum state the
terms of the transaction that led to plaintiffs' injury. 31 "We see no reason to
differentiate from the ties to Texas held insufficient in Helicopteros, the sales of
petitioners' tires sporadically made in North Carolina though intermediaries."
32
25. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
26. Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 389-90 (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 119 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
27. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105.
28. The court's confusion extended to its use of North Carolina precedent. In all of the state
court cases cited, either the claim arose from the use of the defendant's product in the forum, see for
example, Carswell Distrib. Co. v. U.S.A.'s Wild Thing, Inc., 468 S.E.2d 566, 568 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996) (distributor brought action for economic injury in North Carolina caused by defective boats
sent to plaintiff in North Carolina); Cox v. Hazelock, Ltd., 411 S.E.2d 640, 643 (N.C. Ct. App.
1992) (plaintiff injured by water pressure sprayer in North Carolina); Warzynski v. Empire Comfort
Sys., Inc., 401 S.E.2d 801, 805 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (plaintiff injured in North Carolina by a gas
heater); Bush v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 306 S.E.2d 562, 563 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (injury to
plaintiff in North Carolina by defendant's defective product); Hankins v. Somers, 251 S.E.2d 640
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (defendants charged with stealing North Carolina plaintiff's art concept and
selling the art in North Carolina), or the defendant had sent its product directly into the forum and
had not simply inserted the product into the stream of commerce, see for example, Dillon v.
Numismatic Funding Corp., 231 S.E.2d 629, 632-33 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (defendant's direct sale
of over $50,000 in coins to forum residents supported general jurisdiction).
29. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 (2011) (citing
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)). The Court refused
to consider whether the corporate relationships between Goodyear USA and its foreign subsidiaries
provided additional support for jurisdiction over the subsidiaries because plaintiffs failed to assert
that argument in a timely fashion, and they had therefore waived that argument pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 15.2. Id.
30. Id. at 2855.
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That unassailable conclusion would have been sufficient to dispose of the
case, and technically, that is the only "holding" of the decision. But the
opinion goes further, and therein lies its significance. The Court also found the
defendants' contacts to be well short of those present in Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co.,34 the only Supreme Court decision to sustain the
exercise of general jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.3 5 The defendant
in Perkins was a Philippine corporation that had moved its business to Ohio
during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. 36 The Court sustained Ohio's
exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendant for a claim not substantially
related to any activity in Ohio. 37  Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Goodyear
Dunlop notes that "[u]nlike the defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime
business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at home in
North Carolina."
38
That observation on its own may have simply reflected the obvious fact that
Ohio had a much stronger jurisdictional claim in Perkins, which the Court
described as "[t]he textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised
over a foreign corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum."3 9 If a
defendant is at home in the forum, that is a sufficient connection to support
general jurisdiction.40 But Justice Ginsburg further appears to suggest that
general jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible only in a situation like that in
Perkins: "A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or
foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their
affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render them
essentially at home in the forum State."4' She doesn't say that this is the only
33. Cf Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown (August 29, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1919208 (arguing that the
decision is amenable to radically different interpretations).
34. 343 U.S. 437 (1952).
35. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952)).
36. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48. The president, who was also the general manager and
principal shareholder of the corporation, had a farm in the Ohio town where the company was
relocated. Hoffheimer, supra note 33, at 17-18 & n.55.
37. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448. But see Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General
Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 119, 124 (arguing that the claims asserted for unpaid dividends
and damages flowing from the failure to issue stock certificates were related to defendant's
corporate activities in Ohio). Cf. Hoffheimer, supra note 33, at 19 n.61 (arguing that Ohio could
have exercised personal jurisdiction on the basis that "[t]he corporate officers authorized to perform
the duties were in Ohio; corporate funds were in Ohio; and an Ohio bank served as transfer agent
for shares in the corporation").
38. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857.
39. id. at 2856 (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir.
1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 633
(1988) [hereinafter Twitchell, The Myth] ("[G]eneral jurisdiction is almost always available at a
defendant's 'home base."').
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circumstance in which general jurisdiction is permitted, but that is the clear
implication. In other words, that level of activity is not simply sufficient, it is
necessary.
Notwithstanding the Court's citation of International Shoe for that
proposition, the International Shoe decision simply states that "there have been
instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes• •• ,,42
of actions arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities., The
"essentially at home" language is new, and neither of the two cases cited by
International Shoe suggest the need for home-like contacts.4 3 Indeed, as far as I
can tell, the essentially at home standard does not appear in any prior federal or
state judicial decision. 44
This constraint, however, aligns the Court with many academic
commentators, including myself, who have advocated limiting significantly the
operation of general jurisdiction.45 It is also consistent with international
consensus: Article 2 of the European Regulation on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments permits general jurisdiction over
member-state defendants only in their state of domicile,46 and the draft Hague
Convention on International Enforcement of Judgments would have prohibited
42. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co., v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565
(1921); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1917)).
43. In Reynolds, jurisdiction was sustained on the basis of a Kansas corporation's
appointment of an agent in the forum for receipt of service of process, see Reynolds v. Mo., Kan. &
Tex. Ry. Co., 228 Mass. 584, 588 (1917), and in Tauza, jurisdiction was sustained on the basis that
the existence of the defendant's sales office, with seven desks and employees, in the forum
constituted "doing business." Tauza, 115 N.E. at 916-17.
44. A Westlaw search for "essentially at home" yields no jurisdiction cases decided prior to
Goodyear. Professor Hoffheimer suggests the possibility that it was appropriated from the Ninth
Circuit decision in Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114,
1125 (9th Cir. 2002). Hoffheimer, supra note 33, at 43 n.157 ("for general jurisdiction a defendant
must not only enter the house but [sit] down and [make] itself at home" (quoting Glencore Grain,
284 F.3d at 1125) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
45. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEx. L. REV.
721, 726 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction]; Friedrich K. Juenger, The American
Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 141, 161-63 (2001); Harold G. Maier &
Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 249, 256 (1991); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law
of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 758 (1987) [hereinafter Stein, Styles of Argument];
Twitchell, The Myth, supra note 40, at 676; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1144.
Professor Twitchell subsequently professed a change of heart in a later article, in which she was
prepared to extend general jurisdiction to states in which defendants are doing business through
continuous and systematic forum activities. See Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business
With Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CH. LEGAL F. 171 (2001) [hereinafter Twitchell, Doing
Business].
46. LINDA J. SILBERMAN, ALLAN R. STEIN & TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 211-12 (3d ed. 2009).
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signatories from exercising jurisdiction based on a defendant merely doing
business in the forum.47
Assuming that the Court intends to permit the exercise of general
jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations only when they are "essentially at
home" in the forum, courts must flesh out what that means. What are the
attributes of being "at home" that justify jurisdiction? And what is the meaning
of "essentially"? Presumably, that is something short of "actually" being at
home, but how short? Can a large corporation be essentially at home in
numerous states, or should that phrase be understood only in reference to a
situation like Perkins, in which the forum was, for all practical purposes, the
only place that defendant could be sued?
48
In order to answer these crucial questions, we have to understand why
general jurisdiction is constitutionally justified.
II. FROM PRESENCE TO CONTACTS: IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF
JURISDICTIONAL JUSTIFICATION
The law of personal jurisdiction was fundamentally altered by International
Shoe49 and the ramifications of that change are still being worked out, sixty-
seven years later. As the Court replaced a doctrine built on physical presence
50
51with one based on minimum contacts, it never adequately developed the
conceptual underpinnings of the new foundation. This failure has caused.... 52
profound confusion in both specific and general jurisdiction. Specific
jurisdiction, at least, has been the subject of numerous Supreme Court decisions
since International Shoe.53  General Jurisdiction, by sharp contrast, was the
subject of only two decisions54 prior to Goodyear Dunlop, three if you count
47. See Linda J. Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the
Proposed Hague Judgments Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 338-39 (2003);
Juenger, supra note 45, at 161-63.
48. Cf. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.1 1 (1984) (emphasizing that in
Perkins, "Ohio was [Benguet Mining's] principal, if temporary, place of business so that Ohio
jurisdiction was proper even over a cause of action unrelated to the activities in the State").
49. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
50. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878).
51. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
52. See Juenger, supra note 45, at 155-56 ("[W]e still don't know when states may assert
dispute-blind jurisdiction over nonresident corporations.").
53. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980).
54. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
2012]
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Burnham. 55  This lack of appellate guidance has allowed a cacophony of
disparate approaches in the lower courts.56
Pennoyer v. Neff constitutionalized the law of personal jurisdiction. It held
that assertions of jurisdiction by courts that lacked legitimate authority over the
defendant violated the Due Process Clause. 58  This core holding was just
reaffirmed by J. McIntyre: Due process demands a legitimate justification for the
state's exercise of coercive authority over defendants.
59
The sole measure of constitutional legitimacy in Pennoyer was the physical
presence of the person or Zroperty of the defendant in the forum at the time that
jurisdiction was asserted. If the defendant was then served, or his property
then attached, the court's authority was considered legitimate and passed
constitutional muster. Pennoyer made no distinctions between cases related
and unrelated to the forum. 62 If the defendant was present and served, he was
subject to the state's judicial authority for all purposes. 63 If the defendant was
absent, his prior wrongdoing in the forum was irrelevant. 64 Thus, the distinction
between general and specific jurisdiction is an artifact of the post-International
Shoe model.65
As Professor Kurland demonstrated, the relatively simple Pennoyer model
based on physical presence was destabilized by the rise of the corporate form.
66
In order to determine whether an individual defendant was present in the state at
the time it was served with process, the court needed only to look at where he
was standing when process was served.67 Corporations, however, have no feet.
They own property, employ agents, and engage in activity. But the person of a
corporation is not embodied in any physical form comparable to an individual's
55. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (upholding general jurisdiction over an
individual on the basis of service of process in the state).
56. See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L.
REv. 807, 809-10 (2004) (describing six basic approaches jurisdictions employ); Twitchell, The
Myth, supra note 40, at 629 (analyzing the conceptual confusion surrounding the meaning and scope
of general jurisdiction).
57. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878).
58. See id. at 733.
59. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) ("[W]hether a judicial
judgment is lawful depends on whether the sovereign has authority to render it."); cf Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011) ("A state court's assertion of
jurisdiction exposes defendants to the State's coercive power, and is therefore subject to review for
compatibility with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))).
60. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
61. Id. at 733-34.
62. Id. at 722.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 733.
65. See Twitchell, The Myth, supra note 40, at 614-15.
66. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 577-86 (1958).
67. See id. at 574 (describing the bases of personal jurisdiction over individuals).
[VOL. 63: 527
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body.68  Accordingly, to ask whether the person of the corporation was
physically present in the state at the time of service of process is something of a
category mistake.
This category mistake was recognized by International Shoe:
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction
intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike
an individual its "presence" without, as well as within, the state of its
origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by
those who are authorized to act for it. To say that the corporation is so
far "present" there as to satisfy due process requirements... is to beg
the question to be decided. For the terms "present" or "presence" are
used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent
within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process. Those demands may be met by such contacts
of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in
the context of our federal system of government, to reuire the
corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.
Unfortunately, the Court brought considerably less clarity to the question of
the criteria of jurisdictional reasonableness. The Court's discussion of what we
now deem general jurisdiction was particularly sparse, noting that there have
been "instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on
[unrelated] causes of action., 70 But what about those operations justified such
expansive authority?
The Court hinted at a few pertinent criteria. First, "[an 'estimate of the
inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its
'home' or principal place of business is relevant in this connection. As I,
and others,73 have argued elsewhere, notwithstanding its prominent place in the
International Shoe decision, convenience has had relatively little traction in
subsequent Court decisions. The Court has made clear that a convenient forum
does not thereby acquire jurisdiction absent other significant connections
68. See id. at 577 (explaining that a corporation's presence is thought of as fictive).
69. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945) (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 318.
71. Id. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d. 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930) (L.
Hand, J.)).
72. See Stein, Styles of Argument, supra note 45, at 704-05; Allan R. Stein, Personal
Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98
Nw. U. L. REV. 411, 427-28 (2004) [hereinafter Stein, Regulatory Precision] (marginal burden of
litigation created by an inconvenient forum is trivial in relation to overall burden of litigation).
73. See Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction, supra note 45, at 730 (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)).
20121
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between the defendant and the forum. 74 And, the inconvenience of the forum
will rarely divest a court of authority in cases in which defendants do have
significant connections with the forum.
75
However, convenience might be thought to have more relevance to questions
of general jurisdiction than specific. The Court's explicit comparison with
litigation in the corporate home strongly suggests that a distinctive feature of
being at home is that it is convenient to litigate there, even when the litigation is
unconnected to the forum. 76 Accordingly, an appropriate criterion for whether a
corporate defendant is essentially at home in the forum might be whether its
activities in the forum are so pervasive as to make it no more burdensome to
litigate an unrelated claim in the forum than in the principal place of business.
Presumably, under such a criterion, we could look to the location of business
records and executives who would be responsible for participating in and
overseeing the litigation.
I don't want to dismiss such a criterion out of hand, but I think our intuitions
are ultimately not so different than in cases of specific jurisdiction. Imagine a
corporation headquartered in Camden, New Jersey (yes, there are still one or
two). Camden is two miles from the center of Philadelphia. It is serviced by the
Philadelphia airport, and many employees who work there live in Pennsylvania.
Assume that the corporation conducts some regular, but limited, sales in
Pennsylvania, so that there is "purposeful availment" there. However, they have
been sued in Pennsylvania for claims arising in California, completely unrelated
to their Pennsylvania activity. Would any court find the company's
Pennsylvania activity sufficient to justify general jurisdiction simply because it
would be no more burdensome for the company to litigate in Philadelphia than in
Camden? I think not.
That is not to say that convenience is not a necessary condition for the
operation of general jurisdiction, but I don't think it is appropriate to make it the
touchstone. Missing from the convenience justification is an account of
Pennsylvania's authority. What gives the state the authority to act coercively on
the defendant? International Shoe suggested two possible justifications, and
both are problematic as applied to general jurisdiction: jurisdiction represents a
quid pro quo for the benefits that a defendant has received in availing itself of its
connections with the state, 77 and the commission of a single act in a state can
74. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
251, 254 (1958)).
75. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251. But see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.
102, 114-16 (1987) (determining that the burden to the Japanese manufacturer of litigating in
California, coupled with lack of state interest in the controversy, rendered jurisdiction
constitutionally inappropriate).
76. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141
(2d Cir. 1930)).
77. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (exercising the privilege of doing business justifies subjecting
a defendant to the burden of defending a lawsuit).
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subject a defendant to jurisdiction "because of [its] nature and quality and the
circumstances of [its] conmmission.
' 78
I have elsewhere argued that this later justification focusing on the
circumstances of the single bad act is based on a state's regulatory interest in the
underlying controversy. States normally have authority over absent defendants
to redress harm caused by the defendant's activity within or outside of the
forum.80 Such authority to assert specific jurisdiction can be easily squared with
the operation of a federal system: a state's assertion of authority will rarely be
considered extravagant when it is ultimately grounded in a legitimate desire to
protect persons or property within its borders, at least when defendant has
volitionally affiliated itself with the state.81 And, a limited number of states will
be in a position to adjudicate such related claims.
In the case of general jurisdiction, that regulatory justification is, by
definition, off the table. The forum state is asserting a kind of extra-territorial
regulatory authority: the authority to hold the defendant accountable for actions
that it took outside the state and that had no significant impact within the state.
It is possible that one could develop a theory of general jurisdiction based on
the level of benefit that a defendant has received from the forum: general
jurisdiction would be justified under such an approach when the defendant has
availed itself of massive forum benefits. 82  I don't find such a justification
compelling as applied to specific jurisdiction, 83 and assessing an appropriate
level of reciprocal benefits to justify general jurisdiction seems particularly
arbitrary. How much benefit must a defendant receive before it is appropriate to
impose the burden of general jurisdiction? Is there any necessary proportionality
between the amount of benefit a defendant receives from continuous activities in
the forum and the burden of defending all litigation there?8
4
Some scholars have asserted that general jurisdiction is appropriate
whenever an out-of-state corporation has the same level of contacts, and thus
receives the same level of benefits, as does an in-state corporation. 85  The
78. Id. at 318.
79. See Stein, Styles of Argument, supra note 45, at 699; see also Lea Brilmayer, How
Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUp. CT. REV. 77, 85-
86.
80. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784-85 (1984) (sustaining personal jurisdiction
in California over defendants who had libeled plaintiff from outside California).
81. See Stein, Styles of Argument, supra note 45, at 698 & n.48 (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at
317, 319).
82. See Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction, supra note 45, at 733 ("On balance, the reciprocal
benefits and burdens rationale provides the most satisfactory basis for the state's exercise of
coercive power.").
83. Stein, Styles of Argument, supra note 45, at 734-38; accord, Twitchell, Doing Business,
supra note 45, at 175.
84. See Twitchell, Doing Business, supra note 45, at 175.
85. See Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction, supra note 45, at 742 ("[T]he due process clause
should permit general jurisdiction on the basis of activities when the defendant reaches the quantum
2012]
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problem with this approach is that it compares apples and oranges. Just because
a defendant might enjoy the same benefits as a domestic corporation does not
mean that the burden of litigating there is equivalent. The defendant could still
be treated as an outsider by the judge and jury,86 and the multiplicity of forums
with jurisdictional authority over such defendants exposes them to flagrant
forum shopping.s  Multiplicity creates a unique burden: being amenable to
general jurisdiction in one place may be an appropriate burden; being amenable
to general jurisdiction in multiple places can be oppressive. This approach also
has the potential of expanding general jurisdiction to the lowest common
denominator of contacts that the smallest domestic corporation has with the state.
One could imagine that most Fortune 1000 companies have greater contact with
all fifty states than the smallest corporation in those states. This represents a
particularly poor measure of being essentially at home insofar as such contacts
might be trivial compared to the defendant's home-state contacts.
I want to suggest an alternative understanding of essentially at home that is
derived not so much from a quid pro quo theory as a citizenship-like affiliation.
The touchstone of such a relationship, I suggest, should be whether the defendant
would consider itself at home in the forum. This approach is based on the
premise that defendants have a unique relationship with their home; the relative
singularity of that relationship is at the core of its justification.
While we would resist allowing most states to control the behavior of
persons outside their borders, we are comfortable with a citizen's home state
asserting extraterritorial authority; the power of a state to tax out-of-state
income 8 of a citizen or to regulate his extraterritorial behavior is well
89established. Indeed, that kind of extraterritorial authority is a big piece of our
understanding of the nature of citizenship. As a United States citizen, I owe an
allegiance to the American government-it is sovereign in relation to me-
of local activity in which a purely local company typically would engage."); Rhodes, supra note 56,
at 888.
86. See Twitchell, The Myth, supra note 40, at 171 ("[U]nlike citizens or corporations based
within the forum, [an out-of-state corporation] is often not 'local' in its own eyes or in the eyes of
the community because its major economic ties are outside the boundaries of the state and it has
strong ties to at least one other sovereign.").
87. See id. ("If general jurisdiction is permitted to extend beyond the defendant's home base,
plaintiffs may forum-shop among the various states where general jurisdiction is available, looking
for the most favorable choice-of-law rule.").
88. Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the New Economy: A
Theoretical and Comparative Perspective,38 GA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (noting that domicile provides
jurisdiction basis to tax income regardless of source: "Enjoyment of the privileges of residence in
the State and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws are inseparable from
responsibility for sharing the cost of government" (quoting New York ex rel Cohn v. Graves, 300
U.S. 308, 312-13 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
89. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941); Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction, supra
note 45, at 732. See generally I. Glenn Cohen, Circumvention Tourism, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (on file with author) (analyzing expansive authority of states to regulate
extraterritorial conduct of citizens).
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regardless of my physical location. Thus, giving the home state plenary judicial
authority over its citizens comports with a broader, universal authority that states
normally possess over their citizens.
90
The question, then, is whether other states with which defendant may be
closely affiliated can legitimately assert that same kind of extraterritorial
authority. As Lea Brilmayer has pointed out, there is a more compelling case for
limiting the number of states that can assert extraterritorial legislative authority
than those that can assert extraterritorial judicial authority. 91 It would obviously
create systemic chaos and impose an intolerable burden on individuals for
multiple governments to tax the same income, or to criminalize different conduct
in the same place. The relative singularity of citizenship 92 represents an essential
firewall against conflicting sovereign regulations of the same primary conduct.
A multiplicity of adjudicative jurisdictional authority does not generate the
same level of systemic chaos. 93 Even though a defendant might be amenable to
suit in a number of places, the defendant is typically subject to a single lawsuit
by any given plaintiff. But giving a plaintiff an array of possible forums with
general jurisdiction to pick from does generate a substantial level of systemic
chaos and unfairness.
The poster-child for the cost of general jurisdiction is Ferens v. John Deere
Co.94 The plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured by a John Deere
combine harvester in Pennsylvania. 95  He, unfortunately, waited three years
before filing suit.96 As a result, his tort claim was time-barred in Pennsylvania,
as well as in most other states.97  The plaintiff, thus, chose to file suit in
Mississippi, where the statute of limitations on his claim was six years, and
where John Deere, a Delaware corporation with it principal place of business in
Illiniois, sold a lot of tractors. 98 Under the Supreme Court's holding in Sun Oil
v. Wortman,99 Mississippi was constitutionally permitted to apply their own
statute of limitations to any claim pending in their courts."° Deere did not
challenge personal jurisdiction,10' apparently concluding that its continuous and
90. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1940); Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction,
supra note 45, at 732 ("The state can extract these special responsibilities from its domiciliaries
even when they are absent from the state .... ").
91. See Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction, supra note 45, at 775-78.
92. Both individuals and corporations can maintain multiple citizenships. However, courts
tend to confine the concept of "domicile" to a single place. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11(2) (1971) ("[Nlo person has more than one domicile at a time.").
93. See Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction, supra note 45, at 778.





99. 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
100. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 521 (citing Ferens v. Deere & Co., 487 U.S. 1212 (1988)).




Stein: The Meaning of Essentially at Home in Goodyear Dunlop
Published by Scholar Commons, 2012
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
systematic contacts with Mississippi rendered it subject to general jurisdiction
there, a conclusion supported by a wealth of precedent.I12
Having thus revived his claim by filing suit in Mississippi, the plaintiff then
moved to transfer the case back to Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). 10 3  Concurring in the plaintiff's assertion that the case had no
meaningful connection to Mississippi and would be more appropriately
adjudicated in Pennsylvania, the court transferred the case to Pennsylvania.
104
When the defendant moved to have the transferred case dismissed under the one-
year Pennsylvania statute of limitations, the Supreme Court determined that the
Pennsylvania transferee court was bound to apply the Mississippi transferor
court's statute of limitations.10 5 Plaintiff was thus able to have his cake and eat it
too; he was permitted to litigate in his home forum, but appropriate Mississippi
law.
From both a federalism and individual fairness perspective, the case is an
unmitigated train wreck. Pennsylvania's authority to determine how long its
causes of action are viable was displaced by Mississippi's assertion of judicial
authority, and the defendant lost the case simply because the plaintiff had the
power to pick one of the many fora in which John Deere was then amenable to
general jurisdiction. 106
One might be tempted to conclude that the real culprits in Ferens were either
Sun Oil, which allowed Mississippi to apply their own statute of limitations,
1°7
and/or Van Dusen v. Barrack,10 8 which mandated application of the Mississippi
statute upon transfer1 °9 There is no question that those cases exacerbated the
problem, but neither of those doctrines would have mattered without general
jurisdiction. Moreover, even in cases in which choice of law is less directly
affected, general jurisdiction strains the rational allocation of authority in a
federal system,"0 and it unbalances the scales of justice by giving the plaintiff
the power to manipulate the outcome by picking a favorable forum. A handful
of judicial districts across the country have become magnets for litigation against
102. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
103. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 520.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 531-32 (explaining rationale for holding that Mississippi law applies).
106. See id. at 527 (reasoning that the plaintiff can already forum shop); cf Brilmayer,
General Jurisdiction, supra note 45, at 725 n. 18 (discussing similar outcomes in other cases).
107. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 521 (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988)).
108. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
109. See Ferens, 494 U.S. at 523 (explaining the application of Van Dusen).
110. Cf. Maier & McCoy, supra note 45, at 252:
Once it is conceded that a forum has judicial jurisdiction, that forum unavoidably
controls or determines the result in that case between the parties before it. Even if the
forum court decides to "apply" a foreign state's rule of law, the forum does not apply that
law as an agent of the foreign state or as a surrogate for the foreign state's courts. Rather,
it makes its own "law" when it decides the case, using only for guidance the local law
policies that the foreign state's courts would apply if the case were being decided as a
wholly domestic case in the foreign state.
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large, interstate corporations because of their tendency to render large jury
awards."' The more permissive the constitutional standards for the exercise of
general jurisdiction, the more these problems arise.n 2 Accordingly, as a matter
of sound policy and fairness, there is a practical need to constrain general
jurisdiction. And as long as the plaintiff is able to pursue a defendant in its home
forum, there is little necessity for expanding the options to include multiple
jurisdictions that have no connection to the underlying controversy.
Perhaps the most compelling case for a more expansive approach is in the
case of a forum resident injured by a foreign defendant, the situation in-- , 113
Goodyear Dunlop. Unlike a claim against a domestic defendant, the plaintiff
does not have as easy of an option as simply traveling to another American
forum to seek her remedy. Some scholars, notably Linda Silberman 114 and Mary
Twitchell, 5 have suggested that providing general jurisdiction to resident
plaintiffs based on a pervasive contacts approach would provide plaintiffs with
an assured domestic remedy without exposing the defendant to excessive forum
shopping by non-resident plaintiffs.
Although this approach might represent a pragmatic compromise, it is
difficult to construct a principled justification, consistent with the rest of the
Court's jurisdictional approaches, for treating cases brought by in-state plaintiffs
differently than claims brought by out-of-state plaintiffs. These are cases which,
by definition, lack sufficient connection with the forum to qualify for specific
jurisdiction. The only time general jurisdiction will be invoked is when the
wrongful conduct and injury occurred elsewhere. The only nexus with the forum
is plaintiff's domicile. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the there must
be a constitutionally appropriate relationship between the defendant and the
forum, and the plaintif's connection to the forum does not serve to compensate
for a defendant's otherwise insufficient contacts.1 6 The Court reemphasized this
111. See Alexander Lemann, Note, Sheep in Wolves' Clothing: Removing Parens Patriae
Suits Under the Class Action Fairness Act, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 121 n.4 and accompanying
text (2011) (citing John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They're Making a Federal Case out
of It... in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 160-64 (2001); Victor E. Schwartz et al.,
Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity
Jurisdiction Reform, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 499 (2000)).
112. See Allan R. Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction: From Isolation to Connectedness, 2001 U.
CI. LEGAL F. 373, 385 (2001) [hereinafter Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction] (discussing general
jurisdiction and the problems associated with forum shopping).
113. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
114. See Silberman, supra note 47, at 340-41.
115. See Twitchell, Doing Business, supra note 45, at 209-10 (citing Silberman, supra note
47, at 340-41).
116. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412 n.5 (1984) (citing
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788
(1984)); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980). But see Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1986) (prior dismissal of claim by resident
plaintiff weakens the state's interest in asserting jurisdiction over remaining foreign parties).
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principle in Goodyear Dunlop.117 And perhaps I betray my roots as a defense
lawyer (and the spouse of a defense lawyer) by conceding that it doesn't really
bother me that the plaintiffs in Goodyear Dunlop were forced to pursue their
remedies for the injuries suffered in France in a French court. And I don't think
I would have been any more troubled had the defendants conducted significantly
greater activities in the forum. Not everyone gets to sue at home.
The other principal defense of general jurisdiction comes from those who
view the doctrine as a necessary gap filler to accommodate the inadequacies of
specific jurisdiction.l11 I share their view that the Court has unduly constrained
specific jurisdiction, 1 9 and Nicastro only compounds the problem. I think
Justice Ginsburg was right there as well.12°  Nonetheless, using general
jurisdiction to fix inadequacies in specific jurisdiction strikes me as akin to
setting one's house on fire if the radiators aren't working effectively. The harm
from the fix far exceeds the benefit. In most cases where the plaintiff is unable
to use specific jurisdiction, she has the option of traveling to the defendant's
home state; she is not without a remedy. Moreover, it strikes me as particularly
unrealistic to assume that a Court bent on constraining specific jurisdiction
would be open to an expansive understanding of general, and these cases
certainly bear that out.
But my support for a home-base approach to general jurisdiction goes
beyond practical or policy-based reasons. There is something different about the
authority that one's home state has toward members of its political community.
Let me offer an admittedly anecdotal and perhaps idiosyncratic personal
observation. I work in New Jersey but live in Pennsylvania. Much of my
extended family lives in New York and New Jersey, where I grew up. I know
the New Jersey Turnpike like the back of my hand. I have continuous and
systematic connections with most of the mid-Atlantic states. Yet when I return
from visiting family and cross over the Delaware River into Pennsylvania, I feel
a palpable sense of relief. Part of that comfort is, no doubt, attributable to my
sense that my long journey is almost over (and that I no longer have to choose
between driving 75 miles per hour or being run off the road by a sixteen
wheeler). But there is something else, a sense that I have entered into a legal
order that does not view me as an outsider. No cop is going to pull me over for
117. 131 S. Ct. at 2857 n.5 (general jurisdiction has "never been based on the plaintiff's
relationship to the forum" (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1137) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
118. See Borchers, supra note 37, at 129-30 ("[C]urrent specific jurisdiction doctrine contains
several irrational elements, some of which make general jurisdiction an unpleasant necessity.");
Twitchell, Doing Business, supra note 45, at 196-97 ("[T]he doctrine often operates in reality as
something of a specific jurisdiction catchall .... What other cases have taken away, a practical use
of doing-business jurisdiction can restore." (footnote omitted)).
119. See Borchers, supra note 37, at 130-32 (explaining the deficiencies of specific
jurisdiction); Twitchell, Doing Business, supra note 45, at 195-96.
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going five miles over the speed limit simply because I have out-of-state plates on
my car. I still have almost an hour of driving left, but I am home.
I suspect that most citizens standing in the customs and immigration line
upon return from international travel experience a comparable feeling of relief,
even when they have traveled to other democratic states, and even when they
were in no other sense glad to be home.
It is that sense of membership that differentiates my home state from other
places that I have substantial connections with. My sense of belonging is not
simply about having the privilege of voting, or driving, or owning property, or
being in close proximity to my belongings (although all of those things
contribute to and are consequences of Pennsylvania being my domicile). It is
about perceiving, and having others perceive me as a member of their
Community. This, I assert, is what ultimately justifies limiting general
jurisdiction to places where the defendant is essentially at home. I cannot
complain about the authority of my state to hold me accountable for my actions
elsewhere. I will be treated as fairly here as anywhere else.
But how does that sense of "home" translate into determining when a
corporate defendant is essentially at home in the forum? When I use my own
sense of being at home as a measure of a corporation's, I run the risk of
replicating the same kind of category mistake that rendered "presence" an
unworkable measure of jurisdiction over corporations. 122 A corporation no more
has a home, in the sense that a person does, than it has feet.123 But I think there
is an apt corporate analogue to the out-of-state discomfort that I experience: the
notion of being an outsider to the legal community provides an appropriate
measure of jurisdictional overreaching. The touchstone of the inquiry under this
approach is to consider whether the judge or jury would view imposition of
liability on the defendant to be an extemality-a cost that would not be
internalized by the forum community.
This account of general jurisdiction is similar to, but distinct from Lea
Brilmayer's approach.124 Brilmayer, in my view, comes as close to getting it
right as any commentator. She recognizes the important distinction between
"insiders" and "outsiders," but pegs her definition to the level of political
participation and influence exerted in the forum state by the defendant. 125 1 think
this distinction misses the mark slightly for several reasons, as I have argued
elsewhere. 1
26
121. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S 604, 640 n.14 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(citing protection of unfairness to outsiders as the "raison d'tre of various constitutional
doctrines").
122. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945) (explaining the presence
theory with respect to corporations).
123. See Hoffheimer, supra note 33, at 40 (corporations cannot have domiciles in the same
sense as persons, since the concept of domicile focuses on presence and intent).
124. See Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction, supra note 45, at 742-43.
125. Id.
126. See Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction, supra note 112, at 381-82.
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First, it is both over and under inclusive.'2 7 There are many corporations
that have significant influence on political processes in many states- 28 -
particularly after Citizens United.t29 Yet, absent other affiliating circumstances,
I don't think we would be prepared to say that their contacts were sufficient to
sustain general jurisdiction, even under a "continuous and systematic" test, 130 let
alone under one that asks whether the defendant is at home in the forum.'
3t
Conversely, some citizens of the forum, convicted felons or minors, for instance,
may lack the ability to engage fully in the political life of the state, yet, they
would nonetheless be at home in the forum and subject to general jurisdiction
there.
32
Second, there is a bit of a disconnect between democratic participation and
litigation fairness. Brilmayer asserts that the corporation's political participation
is a hedge against its being a non-citizen.1 33  Brilmayer argues, "The basic
inquiry must be whether defendant's level of activity rises to the level of activity
of an insider, so that relegating the defendant to the political process is fair."
1 4
However, in litigation, a defendant is not relegated to the political process, it is
relegated to the judicial process. A corporation's political activity or influence
has little bearing on whether the judge and jury perceive it as a member of their
community. Although one might argue that general jurisdiction is a quid pro quo
for the corporation's participation in the political life of the forum, that is not the
same as being an insider. The corporation would still feel disadvantaged, and
may well be disadvantaged, by their outsider status in front of a jury that neither
knew nor cared about the corporation's political influence. Indeed, it is precisely
that out-of-stater animus that many forum shoppers seek to exploit.' 
35
Finally, a theory based upon democratic theory seems unduly provincial, and
fails to account for the jurisdictional claims of non-democratic regimes.
136
Should we view all jurisdictional claims by a monarch to be illegitimate simply
because no one is able to engage in meaningful political participation? Should
we support the monarch's assertion of general jurisdiction over any outsider who
has the same negligible ability to participate in the political life of the monarchy?
127. See id. at 382.
128. See Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1243, 1253
(1999).
129. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) ("[Tlhe
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of speaker's corporate identity.").
130. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
131. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
132. See Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction, supra note 112, at 382.
133. See Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction, supra note 45, at 742.
134. Id.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
136. See Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction, supra note 112, at 382.
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III. DETERMINING WHETHER A DEFENDANT IS "ESSENTIALLY AT HOME" IN THE
FORUM
How then should courts measure whether a corporate defendant is
"essentially at home" in the forum? Bright lines have not been a characteristic of
personal jurisdiction since International Shoe, and I don't want to pretend that
this approach will completely simplify matters. However, the essentially at
home formulation does begin to provide some standards to an otherwise largely
ad hoc inquiry. 137  Let me suggest some pertinent factors derived from the
principle that a defendant must perceive itself, and be perceived, as a member of
the community:
1. Physical presence matters. Goodyear Dunlop should effectively
prevent courts from finding general jurisdiction on the basis of
business activity that is clearly conducted from out-of-state. 138 In
Helicopteros, the Court held that mere purchases in the forum were
insufficient. 39 Now, it appears that mere sales are insufficient as
well. 140 This should certainly foreclose a finding of general
jurisdiction based on the mere operation of a website that services
residents of the forum, a development that has been roundly
criticized by a number of commentators.
141
2. Litigation in the forum must be as convenient to the defendant as in
any other forum unrelated to the litigation. Although I earlier
dismissed convenience as a sufficient condition of general
137. Cf. Rhodes, supra note 56, at 829-32 (describing as "the ipse dixit approach," the
common tendency of courts to simply list defendant's contacts and then conclude, without analysis,
that the contacts are or are not sufficient to establish jurisdiction).
138. This is consistent with the position of several federal circuits that the defendant's activity
in the forum must approximate physical presence in order to support general jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2011) ("For general
jurisdiction to exist over a nonresident defendant[,] . . . the defendant must engage in 'continuous
and systematic general business contacts' that 'approximate physical presence' in the forum state."
(quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984); Bancroft &
Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000))); Shrader v. Biddinger,
633 F.3d 1235, 1243 (10th Cir. 2011) ("[A]s we are dealing with general jurisdiction, the
commercial contacts here must be of a sort 'that approximate physical presence' in the state-and
,engaging in commerce with residents of the forum state is not in and of itself the kind of activity
that approximates physical presence within the state's borders' (quoting Bancroft, 233 F.3d at
1086)); Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2010) ("The threshold for general
jurisdiction is high; the contacts must be sufficiently extensive and pervasive to approximate
physical presence." (citing Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 787
n.16 (7th Cir. 2003))).
139. Helicoperteros, 466 U.S. at 418.
140. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011).
141. See James R. Pielemeier, Why General Personal Jurisdiction Over "Virtual Stores" Is a
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• • . _. 142jurisdiction, 1 think it is a necessary one. A corporation cannot be
considered at home in the forum if there is another forum in which
it would be considerably more convenient for the defendant to
litigate a matter unconnected to that forum.
3. A corporation can be at home in more than one place. The
Supreme Court recently held that a corporation's principal place of
business for purposes of diversity jurisdiction can only be in one
place, and should be considered the place where corporate decision-
making is located, rather than in the place where the largest amount
of corporate activity is conducted. 14 Although I think it is crucial
for courts to constrain the number of places where corporations are
subject to general jurisdiction, there is no need to limit that to a
single place, or to privilege the locus of corporate decision-making.
The crucial inquiry is whether a jury would view imposition of
liability on the defendant to be an externality-a cost imposed on an
outsider that would not have significant impact within the forum
state. Although I am wary of multiplying the forums in which a
defendant can be said to be essentially at home, there is no reason
why it could not have an insider status in more than one place. It is
particularly appropriate for courts to take into consideration how
invested a defendant is in the forum state, and how apparent that
investment is to the community. 144 Accordingly, the number of
employees should count, as well as other indicia of presence, such
as manufacturing facilities or corporate offices.
4. Defendant's connection to the forum must be comparable to its
connection with any other forum. Even where a defendant does
conduct visible operations in the forum, it may still be a victim of
out-of-state animus if it is perceived as an outsider. 145 If the level of
corporate activity in the forum is significantly less than its activity
elsewhere, there is a risk that it will not be perceived as a member
of the community. For instance, Exxon Mobil maintains significant
operations in all fifty states, yet I doubt that it would be treated as
hospitably in Pennsylvania as in the courts of Texas, its principal
place of business. 46 Accordingly, the operation of a branch office,
a factor urged by a number of commentators as a meaningful
142. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
143. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192-93 (2010).
144. Cf. CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2011) ("To
determine whether a nonresident defendant's contacts are sufficiently substantial, continuous, and
systematic, we consider their '[lI]ongevity, continuity, volume, economic impact, physical presence,
and integration into the state's regulatory or economic markets."' (quoting Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006))).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 121-126.
146. Exxon Mobil, http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/contactus contactbusinesshead
quarters.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
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measure of general jurisdiction,1 47 should not be dispositive. A
house is not a home.
5. Bonafide consent matters. If there is one consistent thread running
through the jurisdictional due process cases, it is that a defendant
can volitionally submit to the authority of a state that would
otherwise lack authority over the defendant. t4 8 Pursuant to this
principle, it is appropriate to subject a defendant to general
jurisdiction in its state (or states) of incorporation even if its
presence in the state is not otherwise apparent. 49  An entity's
choice of incorporation in a particular state is entirely voluntary and
involves continuing responsibility to and regulatory governance by
the state. 150 The state of incorporation is treated as the corporate
home for other purposes, such as tax liability15 1 and diversity
jurisdiction. 52  Indeed, in the nineteenth century, it was the only
place that a corporation could be sued in personam insofar as its
corporate status as a juridical person was only recognized in its state
of incorporation. 53 On the other hand, states commonly require the
corporate appointment of an agent for receipt of service of process
as a condition of doing business in the state. 154  Even before
Goodyear Dunlop, some courts rejected such "consent" as coerced,
and not a sufficient basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction, 5
147. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 37, at 137-38 (discussing whether general jurisdiction
should exist where a defendant has a branch facility); Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction, supra note
45, at 741 (addressing the relevance of local activities in determining general jurisdiction).
148. See Stein, Styles of Argument, supra note 45, at 748-56.
149. Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction, supra note 45, at 733 (noting that the decision to
incorporate in a given state provides in some respects a more compelling basis for jurisdiction than
domicile). .
150. Cf. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality opinion)
(incorporation within the state demonstrates "general submission to a State's powers" (citing
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011))). State of
incorporation was deemed a sufficient jurisdictional basis even under Pennoyer v. Neff. 95 U.S.
714, 735 (1878) ("[A] State, on creating corporations ... may provide a mode in which their
conduct may be investigated, their obligations enforced, or their charters revoked ... .
151. Hellerstein, supra note 88, at 5.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006).
153. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) ("It is very true that a
corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is
created."); Kurland, supra note 66, at 577.
154. Brilmayer, General Jurisdiction, supra note 45, at 756 n.183 ("[A]lI fifty states require
the appointment of a local agent as a condition for transacting certain kinds of business in the
state.").
155. Compare Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971) ("[T]he
principles of due process require a firmer foundation than mere compliance with state domestication
statutes."), and Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1992)
(consent to jurisdiction through corporate registration effective only where there are sufficient
minimum contacts and jurisdiction is otherwise constitutionally permissible), with Knowlton v.
Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990) (appointment of agent for service
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and that position is strengthened by the essentially at home
standard. A state would not have the right to subject a defendant
simply doing business there to general jurisdiction; a requirement
of consent as a condition of doing business thus inappropriately
leverages the state's authority.
To those who might view these criteria as unduly constraining, I would pose
the following query: Why should general jurisdiction be more expansive? As
long as the plaintiff can pursue a claim in the defendant's home, or where the
claim arose, why should the plaintiff be given the strategic advantage of suing
elsewhere? Multiplying the plaintiff's jurisdictional options only unbalances the
scales of justice and vests the responsibility for enforcing one state's law in
another state that has no meaningful connection to the controversy. From both a
fairness and systemic perspective, it cannot be justified.
IV. P.S. WHAT ABOUT GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIVIDUALS?
At the risk of sounding like a rabid sports fan obsessed with a bad call in a
championship game long ago, I want to point out a fairly bizarre fact: the
confluence of Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Hall and Burnham v.
Superior Court, means that it is now much easier to establish general jurisdiction
over individuals than over corporations. To the surprise and dismay of most
commentators, 57 the Court held in Burnham that an individual could be
subjected to jurisdiction in any state in which he was served with process,
regardless of whether the litigation or the individual had any connection to the
forum. 58 The Court went out of its way there to suggest that individuals might
be insulated from assertions of general jurisdiction based on a pervasive contacts
theory. 59 Even at the time, there was something perverse about making in-state
service a more acceptable basis for general jurisdiction than continuous and
pursuant to state registration statute valid basis for general jurisdiction). See generally Lee Scott
Taylor, Note, Registration Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Problem of Predictability, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 1163 (2003) (discussing general registration statutes).
156. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) ("[lI]t has been generally
recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated
items of activities in a state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes
of action unconnected with the activities there." (citing Old Wayne Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204
U.S. 8, 21 (1907); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1882); Frene v. Louisville Cement Co.,
134 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1943))).
157. See generally The Future of Personal Jurisdiction: A Symposium on Burnham v. Superior
Court, 22 RUTGERS L. J. 559 (1991).
158. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
159. See id. at 610 n.1 ("It may be that whatever special rule exists permitting 'continuous
and systematic' contacts to support jurisdiction with respect to matters unrelated to activity in the
forum applies only to corporations, which have never fitted comfortably in a jurisdictional regime
based primarily upon 'de facto power over the defendant's person."' (quoting Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952); Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316)).
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systematic contacts. 160 But having raised the bar in Goodyear Dunlop, the Court
has now made the contrast even starker and stranger.
All of the reasons that support limiting general jurisdiction to a corporate
defendant's home base apply with even greater force to individual defendants.
Litigation away from an individual defendant's home is apt to be far more
burdensome than for a corporation, and an out-of-state individual risks being
subjected to outsider bias as much or more than a foreign corporation.
Moreover, the multiplicity of jurisdictions where an individual might be found
and served could be enormous, thereby increasing significantly the opportunities
for forum shopping by the plaintiff.
Although I do not expect the Court to reverse course, I hope the Court will
move off of its position that jurisdiction over persons is justified by raw
territorial power, whereas jurisdiction over corporations must be justified by a
deeper sense of fairness and a more meaningful connection between the
defendant and the forum state. It is time to fulfill the promise of Shaffer v.
Heitner, that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe.'"'61 If, as asserted by
Mitt Romney, we should treat corporations fairly because "[c]orporations are
people,"' 162 perhaps people can be treated almost as fairly as we treatcorporations.
160. Cf Allan R. Stein, Burnham and the Death of Theory in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L. J. 597, 608 n.51 (1991) (arguing that Justice Scalia "must conclude
that service within the forum is not merely as good a justification as a defendant's pervasive and
systematic contacts with the forum, but rather that is a superior justification" (citing Burnham, 604
U.S. at 610 n.1)).
161. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
162. Philip Rucker, Mitt Romney Says "Corporations Are People" at Iowa State Fair,
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